An informal page for storing Censys/Shodan queries that have returned interesting results.

Including examples for -

  • AsyncRAT, Solarmarker, Amadey, Quasar, Laplas, Sliver, Mythic, Qakbot + more

AsyncRAT - Common x509 Certificates

Hardcoded values in x509 certificates used for TLS communication.

services.tls.certificates.leaf_data.subject.common_name:"AsyncRAT Server" or services.tls.certificates.leaf_data.issuer.common_name:"AsyncRAT Server"


Solarmarker/Jupyter - SSH Configuration Commonalities

Commonalities between ssh host key and running ports. Typically only ports 22 and 80. SSH host key is the primary piece here.

services:(ssh.server_host_key.fingerprint_sha256 = "c655bae831ca57a857b26d76a7c98a56a65d00fdab7d234a64addf8166e3cd09" and port = 22) and services:(service_name:HTTP and port:80) and not services.port:993

Qakbot (Possibly Pikabot) - Masquerading as Slack

Qakbot C2's masquerading as a slack-related site. It is also possible that this is Pikabot which uses similar tactics.

not dns.reverse_dns.names:* and services.http.response.html_title:"Slack is your productivity platform | Slack"

Cobalt Strike - Default Certificate Values

Very generic Cobalt strike indicators based on default certificate values. Likely very unsophisticated actors.

  • services.tls.certificates.leaf_data.issuer.common_name="Major Cobalt Strike" (Link)
  • services.tls.certificates.leaf_data.issuer.organization="cobaltstrike" (Link)
  • services.tls.certificates.leaf_data.issuer.organizational_unit="AdvancedPenTesting" (Link)
  • services.tls.certificates.leaf_data.subject.province="Cyberspace" and"Earth" (Link)
  •"Major Cobalt Strike" (Link)
  •"Major Cobalt Strike" (Link)

Remcos - Re-Used SSH Host Key and Usage of Hestia Control Panel

At least two of these servers are related to Remcos rat. There is a re-used ssh host key that is also related to Jupyter/Solarmarker.

services:(ssh.server_host_key.fingerprint_sha256 = "c655bae831ca57a857b26d76a7c98a56a65d00fdab7d234a64addf8166e3cd09" and port = 22) and services:(http.response.html_title:hestia)

Amadey Bot - Re-used Certificate Values

Re-used CN name in TLS certificates, as well as unique and re-used HTTP response body containing Russian swear words. Full Analysis Here.


Quasar RAT - Re-used Certificate Values

Re-used CN name used in TLS certificates. Full Analysis Here.

services.tls.certificates.leaf_data.subject.common_name: "Quasar Server CA"


Laplas Clipper - Re-used Certificate Values

Re-used CN name used in TLS certificates. Full Analysis here.

services.tls.certificates.leaf_data.subject.common_name:"" or services.tls.certificates.leaf_data.issuer.common_name:""

Sliver C2 - Re-used Certificate Values

Re-used CN names in TLS certificates. Twitter Post

services:(tls.certificates.leaf_data.subject.common_name:multiplayer and tls.certificates.leaf_data.issuer.common_name:operators)

Mythic C2 - Default HTML Title + Default Favicon

Default HTML Titles, favicon hash and CN name.

(services.http.response.html_title="Mythic") or services.http.response.favicons.md5_hash="6be63470c32ef458926abb198356006c" or services.tls.certificates.leaf_data.subject.common_name="Mythic"

Viper Servers - Default String + Favicon Hash

Queries based on "Viper" string in html title and response. Not 100% sure what viper is.

A lot of Viper servers seem to have cobalt strike running on alternate ports.

  • http.html_hash:-1250764086 (Link)
  • +http.title:"viper" +http.html:viper +"Content-Length: 69" (Link)
  • services.http.response.favicons.md5_hash="a7469955bff5e489d2270d9b389064e1" (Link)
  • services:(http.response.html_title:"Viper" and http.response.body:Viper and http.response.headers.content_length:69) (Link)

Cobalt Strike - Ja3 + Empty Certificate Values

Overlapping ja3s and lack of issuer/common names in certificate.
Unconfirmed if all are cobalt strike but at least a few were sucessful hits.

services:(tls.ja3s:475c9302dc42b2751db9edcac3b74891 and tls.certificates.leaf_data.subject.common_name="" and tls.certificates.leaf_data.issuer.common_name="")

Open Directories - .exe files on port 8000

Open directories residing on port 8000 and containing at least one .exe file. Reasonable number of false positives, but a lot of interesting results. eg servers containing revshell.exe and similar.

services:(http.response.html_title:"Directory Listing" and http.response.body:*.exe and port:8000) and not services.port:53 and not services.port:[10000 to 65535]

Open Directories - Referencing Netcat

Open directories containing references to netcat nc.exe

services.http.response.body:"nc.exe" or services.http.response.body:"ncat.exe"

Open Directories - Referencing Common Attack Tooling

Open Directories Containing references to attack tooling. procdump.exe , nc.exe, ngrok.exe etc.

services.http.response.body:"procdump.exe" or services.http.response.body:"nc.exe" or services.http.response.body:"shell.exe" or services.http.response.body:"revshell.exe" or services.http.response.body:"cs.exe" or services.http.response.body:"chisel.exe" or services.http.response.body:"impacket" or services.http.response.body:ngrok.exe

Open Directories - Referencing Powershell Scripts

Open directories containing a file with .ps1 extension. Most of these contain suspicious Powershell scripts.

  • (Any .ps1 script)
services:(http.response.body:*.ps1 and http.response.html_title:"Directory Listing" and banner:Python)
services:(http.response.html_title:"Directory Listing" and http.response.body:?.ps1)

(Single char .ps1 name)

Open Directories - Referencing Anydesk Remote Access Tooling

Open directories with references to Anydesk (remote access tooling). Typically in the form of anydesk.exe or anydesk.bat and coupled with other suspicious files.

services:((http.response.body:anydesk.*) and http.response.html_title:"Directory listing")

Open Directories - Short Executable Names

Open directories containing .exe files with single or double character exe names.

services:(http.response.html_title:"Directory Listing" and http.response.body:??.exe)
services:(http.response.html_title:"Directory Listing" and http.response.body:?.exe)

Open Directories - Single Char Batch Scripts

Suspicious single-character .bat files inside of open directories. eg 1.bat

services:(http.response.html_title:"Directory Listing" and http.response.body:?.bat)

Open Directories - Executable and Script Files

Open directories containing a .exe file and at least one of .vbs,.ps1,.bat. Mostly malicious.

services:(http.response.body:.exe and (http.response.body:.vbs or http.response.body:ps1 or http.response.body:.bat) and http.response.html_title:"Directory Listing")

ProtonVPN Behind Dynamic DNS - Observed in AsyncRAT

Dynamic dns resolving to protonVPN instances. Observed with AsyncRAT fresh03.ddns[.net] resolving to (VPN) 46.166.182[.]34. Difficult to confirm the nature of results as minimal services are running and port forwarding likely used.

services.tls.certificates.leaf_data.subject.common_name:* and dns.names:*

WhiteSnake Stealer - Common Patterns in HTTP Response

Common patterns in http responses for WhiteSnake stealer control panels.
Original IP that inspired query is from RussianPanda's blog.

services:(http.response.body:DutchCoders and http.response.body:keybase and http.response.body:Virustotal)